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Abstract 
This research investigates whether the extent to which fair values are used in financial reports is related to the earnings 
quality measures in Eastern European countries over 2002-2011 periods. It is expected that companies (banks) in Eastern 
Europe will more often estimate fair values by using valuation techniques (i.e. mark-to-model) than companies (banks) in 
market developed countries, due to lack of market data. This gives opportunity to managers to manipulate with estimation 
values and therefore could lead to lower quality of reported earnings. Six earnings quality approximations are examined: 
persistence, predictability, smoothness, accruals quality, value relevance and conservatism. Furthermore, an aggregate 
earnings quality measure is formed based on six earnings attributes. Exposure to fair value accounting is measured by 
income statement approach. First, for both banks and companies in the selected sample, two alternative measures of 
reported income are compared: net income and comprehensive income, because other comprehensive income consists 
mainly of fair value adjustments. Second, reported net gains (losses) on assets at fair value through income statement are 
used to capture the extent to which fair values are used in banks’ income statements. Preliminary empirical findings suggest 
that both firms and banks with increased exposure to fair value accounting in financial reporting have lower level of 
aggregate earnings quality. 
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1. Introduction 
Changing to a fair-value-based accounting system portends a market shift from the traditional historical cost-
based accounting model upon which our existing EQ research is based. How a fair value accounting model is 
likely to impact EQ, and what EQ will look like under such a model is very much an open question.” (DeFond, 
2010, p. 405) 
The use of fair value accounting as the measurement attribute in accounting standards has significantly 
increased in recent time, along with evolution of financial markets and development of complex financial 
instruments. The decline of cost and transaction based model and the rise of market-value (fair value) based 
model of financial reporting has great implications for the role and properties of balance sheet measurement and 
accounting income. The shift in measurement paradigms is caused by presumed belief of higher quality and 
decision relevance of market-based measures in regard to cost based measures (Hitz, 2007, p.324). Contrary, 
our belief is that this assumption of higher quality does not hold in all circumstances, especially for financial 
reporting in an environment with inactive or inefficient markets. We assume that companies and banks in 
Eastern Europe will use valuation techniques to estimate fair values more often, due to lack of market data. This 
could enable opportunistic earnings management practices and consequently could lower the quality of reported 
earnings. 
Fair value is defined as the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an 
orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date (IFRS 13.9). Fair value usually means 
the market value, if there is a deep and liquid market for asset or liability; or if market value is unavailable then 
fair value is measured as an estimate of the value for which one could realize the asset (extinguish the liability). 
However, estimation of fair value (marking-to-model) creates opportunities for the exercise of management 
judgment and intentional bias which can decrease the quality of financial reporting (Nissim, 2003; Hitz, 2007; 
Ryan, 2008; Fiechter and Meyer; 2009; Chen et al., 2010).  
Furthermore, the current global financial crisis has led to a major debate about fair value accounting 
valuation paradigm among accounting and banking regulators, researchers and many others. Namely, critics 
have faulted fair value accounting for amplifying the crisis and for causing financial collapse, creating a circle 
of falling prices and thereby increasing the overall risk in the financial system (Khan, 2010). Fair value income 
is considered as volatile, unreliable and often being a subject of managerial discretion, especially when markets 
are illiquid or distressed. On the other hand, proponents of the fair value method argue that market prices 
provide the most relevant and timely measures of asset and liabilities (e.g. Barth, 1994; Barth and Clinch, 
1998). Chartered Financial Analyst Institute (CFA Institute, 2005) states that investor’s decision about whether 
to purchase, sell or hold investments are based upon the fair values of the investments and expectations about 
future changes in their fair values. Therefore, financial statements based on historical costs are less useful for 
making investing assessments. 
When analyzing the usefulness of fair value information, it is essential to investigate how fair value 
information fulfills its purpose. The overall purpose of financial accounting is to provide decision-useful 
information to investors, lenders and other creditors (IASB, 2011). Thus, earnings quality is considered to be 
contextual and depends on each user’s perspective. Based on this overall objective, two different sub-objectives 
of accounting can be identified (Christensen and Demski, 2003; Ronen and Yaari, 2008): to provide valuation-
relevant information and to provide contracting-relevant information. This means that accounting information 
has two roles: informativeness and stewardship. Ronen and Yaari (2008) emphasize that informativeness role 
comes from investors’ demand for information to predict future cash flows and assesses their risk. The 
stewardship objective of accounting arises from separation between ownership and management in public 
companies. Namely, because of possible conflict of interests between managers and owners, stewardship 
function of financial reporting is to constrain management to act in the shareholders’ interests (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1990). 
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Dechow and Schrand (2004 ) outline that a high-quality reported earnings reflect current operating 
performance, indicate future performance and accurately annuitize the intrinsic value of the company. However, 
earnings quality is a multidimensional concept without general definition and it is difficult to measure it. In 
accordance with previous empirical researches (e.g. Francis et al., 2004; Dechow et al., 2010) this paper 
examines the influence of fair value accounting on six most commonly used measures of earnings quality: 
persistence, predictive ability, volatility, quality of accruals, conditional conservatism and value relevance. In 
addition, to mitigate the potential effects of measurement errors and omitted variables, aggregate earnings 
quality measure is constructed using six earnings attributes as stated before. 
Main empirical results from preliminary research are consistent with our predictions. Findings suggest that 
earnings under a more fair value-based reporting system have lower aggregate quality rankings for companies 
and banks in Eastern European countries. Namely, we find preliminary evidence that fair value gains (losses) 
through other comprehensive income are negatively related with aggregate earnings quality for both companies 
and banks. However, reported net gains (losses) on assets at fair value through banks’ income statement are less 
statistically significant in explaining earnings quality variation. 
The potential contribution of this research to existing literature can be found in several ways. First, to the 
best of our knowledge this is the first study examining the impact of fair value accounting on wide range of 
earnings attributes as well as on the aggregate earnings quality measure. The previous research has mostly 
examined a single earnings quality measure or a subset of earnings quality measures. Second, most international 
studies on fair value accounting and earnings quality are focused on developed, market-oriented countries. This 
research uses a sample of companies and banks from Eastern European, bank-oriented countries which allows 
for better understanding of relation between fair value accounting and earnings quality. Namely, financial 
reporting in these countries differs in relation to market-oriented economies because it is influenced by a variety 
of economic, social and political factors like the legal system, stage of economic growth and development, 
enterprise ownership, activities of enterprises, etc. Thus, it should be explored separately. Third, previous 
studies that use company-year data set mostly rely on econometric methods that assume either cross-sectional 
or time-series independence, or rely on methods developed in accounting literature that have not been formally 
evaluated (Gow  et al., 2010, p. 508). These methods neglect the panel structure of the data and can produce 
misspecified test statistics or spurious inferences. Contrary, our doctoral research will employ panel data 
analysis techniques that allow for individual company heterogeneity as well as for time effect and which could 
consequently provide different findings.    
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents brief summary of previous research on the 
impact of fair value accounting on earnings quality measures. Section 3 describes the research design, sample, 
and variables measurement. Section 4 provides preliminary empirical results and paper ends with concluding 
remarks. 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
The majority of previous studies on fair value accounting investigate usefulness of fair value information for 
the investors on capital market. Taken together, evidence generally suggests that recent implementation of fair 
value accounting has actually increased level of in formativeness of accounting information. Empirical studies 
have found evidence of value relevance for fair values of financial assets (Barth, 1994; Ahmed  and Takeda, 
1995; Petroni and Wahlen, 1995; Eccher et al, 1996; Venkatachalam, 1996; Barth and Clinch, 1998; Park et al., 
1999; Carroll, 2003; Khurana and Kim, 2003; Hassan et al., 2006; Bhat, 2008; Goh et al., 2009; Kolev, 2009; ; 
Song et al, 2010; Bischof et al., 2011;); for fair values of fixed assets (Barth and Clinch, 1998; Aboody et al., 
1999; Richard Dietrich et al., 2000; Easton et al., 2003); for fair value gains and losses through other 
comprehensive income (Dhaliwal et al., 1998; Biddle and Choi, 2006; Casta et al., 2007; Chambers et al, 2007; 
Goncharov and Hodgson, 2008; Kanagaretnam et al., 2009; Jones and Smith, 2011). Thus, researchers mostly 
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agree that fair values provide useful information regarding the amounts, timing and uncertainty of future cash 
flows (Landsman, 2007, p.19; Hitz, 2007, p.325; Barth, 2008, p.1165, Bischof and Wustemann, 2007). 
However, prior literature also shows that when fair values are not determined based on reliable observable 
inputs, then fair value estimates are less relevant (Nelson, 1996; Simko, 1999).  Song et al. (2010), Goh et al. 
(2009) and Kolev (2009) analyze value relevance of fair values based on the source of inputs used to estimate 
fair values. They find that mark-to-model assets are priced less than mark-to-market assets. Furthermore, value 
relevance parameters of fair value estimates are not stable across time, especially they decrease during periods 
of economic turmoil due to greater illiquidity and information risk (Allen and Carletti, 2008; Fiechter and 
Meyer, 2009, p.1; Goh et al., 2009). 
An underlying assumption in the value relevance of fair value research is that fair value information has 
predictive ability of cash flows’ future realizations. Therefore, instead of measuring the association of fair value 
estimates with market prices or returns, usefulness of fair value information can be also directly examined by 
analyzing its predictive ability with respect to future cash flows and future earnings. In explanation, fair value 
estimates represent the present value of expected future cash flows, so if fair values are reliable measures of 
asset values, then changes in fair values (i.e. unrealized fair value gains and losses) should be reflected in 
changes in future performance (Barth, 2000, p.19). Conversely, if fair value estimates are unreliable, then 
association with future performance measures will not be significant. Aboody et al. (1999) research is one of 
the first papers that documented the existence of association between the changes in fair values of fixed assets 
and future operating cash flow and future earnings. They showed evidence those upward revaluations of fixed 
assets for companies in United Kingdom are positively associated with future operating performance. Several 
other studies investigate predictive ability of fair values solely on sample of banks because their financial 
reporting system is considered to be more exposed to fair value accounting. Namely, balance sheet of bank 
consists almost entirely of financial instruments which are mostly required to be reported at fair value. Thus, 
Hill (2009) and Bretten et al. (2012) perform research on banking industry and conclude that increased 
exposure to fair value accounting in financial reporting enhances the ability of earnings to predict future cash 
flows.  Choi et al. (2007) and Evans et al. (2010) also prove that changes in the fair values predict banks’ future 
earnings. However, Hill (2009) emphasizes that these empirical results regarding predictive ability of fair 
values could not be generalized to more volatile market conditions and more subjective applications of fair 
value valuation. In addition, a number of empirical studies provide conflicting results, proving that changes in 
fair values reported in net income or other comprehensive income are transitory and do not increase earnings 
ability to predict future operating performance (Dhaliwal et al., 1999; Chen et al., 2006; Goncharov and 
Hodgson, 2007; Jones and Smith, 2011; Pronobis and Zulch, 2011). 
Contrary to earnings predictive ability, earnings persistence attribute usually stands for the ability of current 
reported earnings to predict itself in future periods. In the context of fair value accounting, previous empirical 
studies mainly investigate the relation between unrealized gains and losses from changes in fair values and 
future operating performance measures (operating cash flows or earnings), while persistence of fair value 
changes is rarely examined. According to Samuelson theorem (Hitz, 2007, p.350) market values should 
incorporate all available information, so any deviation from it cannot be predicted, and consequently fair value 
changes will be purely transitory. On the other hand, Hitz (2007, p.351) concludes that change in fair value 
consists of an expected and unexpected component, so gains and losses from fair value re measurement could 
be correlated in time for some assets, despite market efficiency. Jones and Smith (2011) have empirically 
examined the persistence of gains and losses in other comprehensive income and proved that these items are 
not transitory, but show a negative persistence. 
Besides, earnings persistence and predictive ability are often closely related to level of earnings volatility. 
Namely, smoother earnings are likely to be more persistent and have higher predictive ability. Furthermore, it 
is widely accepted that if financial statement amounts are based more on fair values, the amounts will change 
more from period-to-period than they would in system based more on historical cost (Barth, 2004, p.323). 
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Higher volatility arises from the definition of fair value as the present values of a series of expected future cash 
flows. Thus, any subsequent adjustment in expectation of future cash flow will be automatically reflected in the 
change of fair value. Unlike the fair-value-based reporting, historical-cost-based reporting does not recognize 
changes in values until the asset is sold. Empirical studies almost exclusively prove that the move towards fair 
value accounting leads to increased earnings volatility (Barth et al., 1995; Bernard et al., 1995; Hodder et al., 
2006; Plantin et al., 2008; Sole et al., 2009; Maganan; 2009; Sun et al., 2011;). However, Barth (2004, p.324) 
points out that financial statement volatility per se is not an indication of flawed financial reporting. Contrary, 
providing information relating to the uncertainty and timing of future cash flows (inherent volatility) is a key to 
complete financial reporting. She (Barth, 2004) also identifies three possible sources of financial statements 
volatility that are associated with fair values: inherent volatility, estimation error volatility and mixed-
measurement volatility. Inherent or economic volatility is not caused by the accounting process but it is related 
to the characteristics of the assets or liabilities being measured. Estimation error volatility results from 
imperfect measurements. Namely, because future cash flows are not known, they include estimation. 
Estimation error volatility will be smaller if the fair value is determined based on the prices from active markets 
(marking-to-market) and will be larger if fair value is determined using estimation models and subjective 
assessments (marking-to-model). Third, “artificial” source of volatility is mixed-measured volatility which 
derives from using fair values for some assets and liabilities and historical cost values for others. 
Objective of financial reporting is not only to provide valuation-relevant information for assessment of 
amounts, timing and uncertainty of expected cash flows, but also to fulfill its stewardship role. Namely, given 
the conflict of interests between management and shareholders, earnings can be considered as a performance 
measure to enable shareholders to monitor management (Ronen and Yaari, 2008, p.11). An important 
instrument of stewardship and corporate governance is accounting conservatism and principle of prudence. 
Conservatism prevents managers from being overly optimistic in reporting earnings and consequently aims at 
promoting stewardship. Conservative accounting system recognizes potential decreases in income or assets 
well before they are realized, but postpones the recognition of income increase until it is realized or is 
sufficiently certain. Also, asymmetric timeliness of earnings, well known as conditional conservatism can be 
used as supply-side proxy for the stewardship-orientation of financial accounting information (Gassen, 2008). 
Application of the concept of fair value accounting, by definition, involves timely recognition of economic 
losses as well as economic gains, which consequently implies lower level of conservatism and less asymmetry 
in timely recognition of losses relative to gains (Basu, 1997; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). Goncharov and 
Hodgson (2008) have empirically confirmed that unrealized fair value gains (losses) in other comprehensive 
income reduce the level of earnings conservatism. 
To summarize, when analyzing previous research regarding the association between application of fair value 
accounting and earnings quality measures, following conclusions can be derived. First, there is mixed and 
inconsistent evidence from previous research. Second, most previous research examines earnings quality using 
single earnings attributes or a subset of earnings attributes. Third, majority of prior studies on this topic are 
performed in common law countries such as US, United Kingdom or Australia and there is generally a lack of 
research regarding fair value accounting in transitional economies of Eastern Europe.  
Accordingly, we assume that use of fair value concept may have significantly different effect on the 
earnings quality for Eastern European countries due to several important facts. Namely, business entities in 
continental Europe rely to a greater extent on debt capital and institution of equity financial analysts is under-
developed (Goncharov and Hodgson, 2008, p.1). Hence, the focus of financial reporting is less oriented 
towards needs of investors on capital markets and is more set on creditors, suppliers and other users. Also, it 
can be assumed that in such environment active market prices for large portion assets and liabilities will not be 
available, so fair values are likely to be determined based on the model estimates (marking-to-model). Even 
though managers could use opportunities for discretion in order to convey private information to investors and 
consequently improve earnings quality, we argue that managers are more likely to behave opportunistically in 
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an environment with weak shareholder protection (Hung, 2000, p.402). Chen et al. (2010, p.6) emphasize that 
even without the presence of intentional misrepresentation by managers, the more subjective nature of Level 3 
fair value estimates potentially leads to greater information asymmetry and therefore to greater estimation error. 
Taken all together, we predict that higher exposure to fair value accounting will be negatively related to 
earnings quality for companies (banks) in Eastern Europe. 
3. Research design  
This section describes the sources of empirical data, variables measurement and estimation procedures in 
testing the relation between application of fair value accounting and earnings quality. Research is based on the 
hypothesis that banks and companies with high proportion of fair value gains and losses in income statement 
will have lower level of aggregate earnings quality. Conceptual framework for the research is graphically 
presented in Figure 1. 
Fig. 1. Conceptual framework 
As it can be seen from the figure before, this paper examines the influence of fair value accounting on six 
measures of earnings quality: persistence, predictive ability, and volatility, quality of accruals, conditional 
conservatism and value relevance. Exposure to fair value accounting is measured by income approach. Namely, 
changes in fair values can be reported as gains and losses through net income or other comprehensive income. 
Therefore, we analyze the influence of fair value gains (losses) through other comprehensive income and 
through net income on earnings quality measures separately. In addition, to mitigate the potential effects of 
measurement errors and omitted variables bias, aggregate earnings quality measure is constructed on firm level.  
Furthermore, Wooldridge (2002, p.3) emphasizes how simply finding that two variables are correlated is 
rarely enough to conclude that a change in one variable causes a change in another. Therefore, we use 
econometric methods and also include a set of control variables (size, leverage and industry) that we would 
explicitly hold fixed when studying the effect of unrealized fair value gains (losses) on earnings quality. Also, 
unlike to previous research, special attention is given to the issue of controlling for cross-sectional and time-
series dependence in research models. 
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3.1. Sample  
The sample analyzed in this study consists of listed companies and banks from 17 Eastern European 
countries that are included in Amadeus (Bureau van Dijk), Worldscope (Thomson Financial) and Bankscope 
(Bureau van Dijk) databases in period from 2000 to 2011.  Countries are selected into sample in accordance 
with Bureau van Dijk’s classification of Eastern European countries that includes: Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Montenegro, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, 
Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Serbia and Ukraine. Each company (bank) in the sample must have 
income statement and balance sheet information available for at least six consecutive years, so that aggregate 
earnings quality measure could be calculated. 
The initial sample is partitioned into a subsample of listed companies and a subsample of listed banks. 
Impact of unrealized fair value gains (losses) through other comprehensive income is tested separately on each 
subsample. However, relation between unrealized fair value gains (losses) through net income is tested on the 
banks’ sample only. Namely, we expect that companies will have insignificant amount of unrealized fair value 
gains (losses) through net income in comparison to banks. Also, accrual quality measure is not appropriate to 
use for banks. Thus, aggregate earnings quality measure for banks will be constructed by using only five 
earnings attributes. 
The final subsample of companies consists of 598 companies in period from 2002 to 2011, i.e. 4,244 
company-year observations. Companies’ sample structure by countries is presented in Table 1 below. 
Table 1. Companies’ sample structure by countries 
Country Company-year observations Percent 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 106 2.50 
Bulgaria 458 10.79 
Croatia 236 5.56 
Czech Republic 78 1.84 
Estonia 49 1.15 
Latvia 69 1.63 
Lithuania 60 1.41 
Macedonia 7 0.16 
Montenegro 6 0.14 
Poland 1,170 27.57 
Romania 319 7.52 
Russian Federation 1,112 26.20 
Slovakia 32 0.75 
Slovenia 95 2.24 
Serbia 156 3.68 
Ukraine 55 1.30 
Country data n.a. 236 5.56 
Total 4,244 100.00 
Second subsample consists of 78 banks in period from 2000 to 2011, i.e. 716 bank-year observations. 
Distribution of banks by countries is shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Bank’s sample structure by countries  
Country Bank-year observations Percent 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 19 2.65 
Bulgaria 39 5.45 
Croatia 92 12.85 
Czech Republic 11 1.54 
Lithuania 22 3.07 
Hungary 21 2.93 
Macedonia 17 2.37 
Poland 93 12.99 
Romania 29 4.05 
Russian Federation 225 31.42 
Slovakia 42 5.89 
Slovenia 22 3.07 
Serbia 43 6.01 
Total 716 100.00 
3.2. Variables measurement 
First, in this section we describe six individual selected earnings attributes in context of comprehensive 
income and net income and separately for companies and for banks. Further, we explain how previous research 
has characterized each attribute as desirable. After that, we describe aggregate earnings quality measure 
construction based on Gaio’s (2010) approach. Lastly, we explain proxy variables used for measurement of fair 
vale gains (losses) through other comprehensive income and through net income. 
Earnings quality: 
Previous research regarding earnings predictive ability is mainly motivated by the assumption that the 
prediction of cash flows is useful as input to equity valuation models (Dechow et al., 2010). Also, one of the 
stated purposes of financial reporting by IASB and FASB is to provide information useful for assessing future 
financial performance which can be operationalised by future cash flows. Therefore, earnings can be 
considered as more useful if they accurately predict future cash flows. We apply the following regression 
model to examine the predictive ability of comprehensive income and consequently predictive ability of fair 
value gains through other comprehensive income: 
tititi CICFO ,1,10, εββ ++= −                                                        (1) 
where, CFOi, t is net cash flow from operating activities for company i in year t as reported in the cash flow 
statement, scaled by total assets, CIi,t-1 is comprehensive income for company i in year t-1 measured as ¨BV + 
DIV + NETCAP, where ¨BV is change in book value of equity (Worldscope item WC03501), DIV is 
dividends paid (Worldscope item WC04551) and NETCAP is net capital contributions (represents funds used 
to decrease the outstanding shares of common and/or preferred stock minus amount received from the sale of 
common and/or preferred stock, i.e. WC04751-WC04251) scaled by total assets. For banks’ subsample, CFOi, t 
is defined as net income before tax plus loan loss provisions for bank i in year t scaled by total assets , CIi,t-1 is 
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comprehensive income (Fitch comprehensive income item from BvD Bankscope database) for bank  i in year t-
1 scaled by total assets. 
When analyzing the predictive ability of net income and predictive ability of fair value gains and losses 
through net income for banks, we apply following model: 
tititi NICFO ,1,10, εββ ++= −          (2) 
where, CFOi,t is defined as net income before tax plus loan loss provisions for bank i in year t scaled by 
total assets and NIi,t-1 is net income  for bank  i in year t-1 scaled by total assets. 
Following previous research of Lipe (1990), Francis et al. (2004) and Gaio (2010), our earnings 
predictability measure is based on the variance of earnings shocks, where higher variance implies lower 
predictability. Thus, predictive ability is measured as standard deviation of estimated error from equations (1) 
or (2): 
 
     tiiPRED ,
2εσ=            (3) 
Large values of PRED correspond to less predictable earnings. 
Persistent earnings are current earnings that are likely to be maintained in the future. Persistence captures 
earnings sustainability and it is viewed as desirable earnings attribute. Earnings persistence is measured as the 
slope coefficient from autoregressive models of comprehensive income and net income: 
 
tititi CICI ,1,10, εββ ++= −           (4) 
tititi NINI ,1,10, εββ ++= −           (5) 
Consequently, persistence measure is derived from equations (4) and (5) as negative value of slope 
coefficient estimate: 
 
1β−=iPERS            (6) 
 
Values of slope coefficient ȕ1 close to 1 imply highly persistent earnings, while values of coefficient ȕ1 close 
to 0 imply highly transitory earnings (Francis et al., 2004, p.980). In order to transform this variable to our 
ordering of earnings attributes, we use negative value of coefficient ȕ1. Thus, high values of PERS indicate low 
level of earnings persistence. 
Volatility or smoothness is the third earnings attribute based on time-series property of earnings. It is 
assumed that less volatile earnings are more predictable and persistent. Also, volatility is often connected with 
risk. Thus, smoothness is typically seen as a desirable attribute of earnings. In accordance with previous 
research (e.g. Leuz, 2003; Francis et al. 2004; Gaio, 2010), we measure volatility as standard deviation of 
comprehensive income divided by standard deviation of operating cash flows for every company i: 
 
ti
ti
i CFO
CI
VOL
,
,
)(
)(
σ
σ
=            (7) 
For subsample of banks, volatility measure is computed separately for comprehensive income and for net 
income volatility based on following equations (Hodder et al., 2006): 
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tii CIVOL ,)(σ=            (8) 
tii NIVOL ,)(σ=            (9) 
Higher values of VOL indicate higher volatility and low quality of earnings. 
Earnings value relevance represents the ability of earnings to explain variation in market prices or returns. 
We use the price model to examine link between stock prices and comprehensive income, as in Collins et al. 
(1997, p.45): 
 
tititi CIPSP ,1,10, εββ ++= −                     (10) 
 
where Pi,t is the price of a share of company (bank) i three months after year-end t and CIPSi,t is 
comprehensive income per share of company (bank) i in year t. 
When analyzing the value relevance of net income and impact of fair value gains and losses through net 
income on value relevance for banks, we apply following model: 
tititi NIPSP ,1,10, εββ ++= −                     (11) 
where Pi,t is the price of a share of bank i three months after year-end t and NIPSi,t is net income per share of 
bank i in year t. 
Equations (10) and (11) are estimated for every company (bank) and regression’s explanatory power is used 
as measure of value relevance: 
2
ii RREL −=                     (12) 
Higher values of REL indicate lower value relevance of earnings and thus lower earnings quality. 
Conservative earnings reflect bad news more quickly than good news. Therefore, conservatism causes more 
timely recognition of losses than gains and improves quality of accounting information in the context of 
corporate governance and loan agreements. Asymmetric timely recognition of losses relative to gains is often 
labeled as conditional conservatism, ex post conservatism or earnings conservatism. Conditional conservatism 
acts as an instrument of corporate governance in preventing management manipulations with reported earnings 
numbers and thus is considered to be desirable attribute of financial reporting. The following standard Basu 
(1997) model is used to estimate level of conditional conservatism for companies’ comprehensive income: 
titititititi RIDIRIDICIPS ,,,3,2,10, εββββ ++++=                        (13) 
where CIPSi,t is comprehensive income per share for company i in year t deflated by price per share at 
beginning of year t; Ri,t is buy-and-hold annual stock return for company i  cumulated over year t inclusive of 
dividends; Di,t is dichotomous variable which takes the value of 1 if stock return is negative and 0 otherwise. 
Our measure of conditional conservatism is derived from equation (13) as follows: 
i
ii
iCONS
,2
,3,2
β
ββ +
−=                      (14) 
Higher values of CONS correspond to low level of conditional conservatism and thus to poor quality of 
comprehensive income. 
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Due to the facts that sample of banks is much smaller than sample of companies and that stock return data 
for Eastern European banks are often missing, we use Basu’s (1997) asymmetric persistence model to measure 
level of conservatism for banks. Therefore, we apply following models for comprehensive income and net 
income for banks: 
 
titititititi CIDCIDCI ,1,,31,2,10, εββββ +Δ+Δ++=Δ −−                    (15) 
titititititi NIDNIDNI ,1,,31,2,10, εββββ +Δ+Δ++=Δ −−                   (16) 
where ¨CIi,t is change in comprehensive income for bank i from year t-1 to t, scaled by beginning book 
value of total assets, Di,t is dichotomous variable which takes value of 1 when ¨CIi,t-1 is negative and zero 
otherwise and ¨CIi,t-1 is change in comprehensive income from year t-2 to t-1 scaled by beginning of year 
total assets, ¨NIi,t is change in net income for bank i from year t-1 to t, scaled by beginning book value of total 
assets, Di,t is dichotomous variable which takes value of 1 when ¨NIi,t-1 is negative and zero otherwise and 
¨NIi,t-1 is change in net income from year t-2 to t-1 scaled by beginning of year total assets. 
According to Ball and Shivakumar (2005), positive changes in net income are persistent and tend not to 
reverse, so the implication is ȕ2 = 0. Also, application of conservative accounting causes income decreases to 
be transitory or to reverse, which implies ȕ2 + ȕ3 < 0. Finally, if economic losses are recognized in more timely 
manner than gains than it should be ȕ3 < 0. 
Consequently, our measure of conditional conservatism for banks is derived from equations (15) or (16): 
 
iiCONS ,3β=                        (17) 
 
Also, higher values of CONS suggest lower level of conditional conservatism and lower earnings quality. 
Studies regarding accrual quality generally intend to divide accruals into a component that is associated with 
the company’s fundamental earnings process and into abnormal accruals, which are assumed to be 
discretionary (Dechow et.al, 2010). Higher levels of abnormal accruals are assumed to reduce the quality of 
earnings. 
We use cross-sectional modified-Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) to estimate total abnormal accruals: 
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where subscript i denotes each company in the industry estimation portfolios j by two-digit SIC codes, 
ACCijt is total accruals, TAijt-1 is total assets at the beginning of the year,  ¨REVijt is the change in revenue, 
GPPEijt is gross property, plant and equipment, DACCijt is discretionary (abnormal) accrual component. Similar 
to Gaio (2010), accrual quality measure is computed for every company as the standard deviation of DACC 
from equation (19): 
)(
,tii DACCAQ σ=                        (20) 
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Larger values of AQ indicate poorer quality of accruals and lower level of earnings quality. Because of 
different asset structure and earning process, this accrual quality measure is not appropriate for banks, but only 
for the companies. 
3.3. Aggregate earnings quality 
Aggregate earnings quality measure is separately computed for companies and for banks, as well for 
comprehensive income and net income, based on Gaio (2010) research methodology.  First, companies (banks) 
are ranked according to each of six (five) individual measures of earnings quality. Then aggregate quality 
measure is computed for each company (bank) by averaging its ranking over the six (five) individual quality 
measures. 
Aggregate measure of earnings quality (AEQ) for company’s comprehensive income is derived from 
equations (3), (6), (7), (12), (14) and (20): 
 
6
)]()()()()()([ iiiiii
i
AQRANKCONSIRANKRELRANKVOLRANKPERSRANKPREDRANK
AEQ +++++=                        (21)
21)
 
Aggregate measure of quality (AEQ) for bank’s comprehensive income is derived from equations (3), (6), 
(8), (12) and (17): 
 
5
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AEQ ++++=                                          (22)
)
 
 
Finally, aggregate measure of earnings quality (AEQ) for bank’s net income is derived from equations (3), 
(6), (9), (12) and (17) by the same equation as (22). 
3.4. Fair value gains and losses  
Exposure to fair value accounting is measured by income statement approach (Hodder et al., 2006, Bratten 
et al., 2012). First, we compare two alternative measures of reported income: net income and comprehensive 
income for both banks and companies in the selected sample. Namely, difference between comprehensive 
income and net income is other comprehensive income which consists mainly of fair value adjustments 
(unrealized fair value gains and losses on available-for-sale securities, changes in revaluation surplus, actuarial 
gains and losses on defined benefit plans, the effective portion of gains and losses on hedging instruments in a 
cash flow hedge, translation gains and losses). Relative importance of other comprehensive income (absrelOCI) 
is calculated as the ratio of absolute value of other comprehensive income (absOCI) and the sum of the absolute 
value of net income (absNI) and absolute value of other comprehensive income (absOCI): 
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titi
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ti OCIabsNIabs
OCIabs
absrelOCI
+
=                      (23) 
 
Fair value gains (losses) can be also reported through net income (e.g. subsequent measurement of financial 
assets and liabilities held for trading, investment property). We assume that banks have significantly greater 
proportion of their assets and liabilities that is reported at fair value through net income than companies. Thus, 
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we analyze the extent of fair value gains (losses) through net income (FVI) only for banks. FVI is measured by 
BvD Bankscope item Net gains (losses) on assets at FV through income statement.  
Relative importance of fair value gains and losses through net income (absrelFVI) is calculated as the ratio 
of absolute value of FVI (absFVI) and the sum of absolute value of FVI (absFVI) and absolute value of net 
income without FVI for every bank (absHI): 
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+
=                     (24) 
 
4. Preliminary empirical results 
In this section we report preliminary results of tested association between the extent of exposure to fair value 
accounting and earnings quality measures. First, we estimate the effect of fair value gains (losses) through other 
comprehensive income on aggregate earnings quality for both banks and companies. After that, we analyze the 
association between fair value gains (losses) through net income and earnings quality only for banks. 
4.1. Impact of fair value gains (losses) through other comprehensive income on earnings quality 
In the first part of empirical research, descriptive analysis is conducted. Table 3 provides pooled mean 
values, medians and standard deviations for relative importance of fair value gains and losses through other 
comprehensive income. Results show high reliance on other comprehensive income (mean value of 0.435 
percent for companies and 0.124 percent for banks). 
Table 3: Relative importance of FV gains and losses through other comprehensive income (OCI) 
Relative importance of OCI (absrel OCI) Companies Banks 
Mean 0.435 0.124 
Median 0.405 0.009 
Standard deviation 0.303 0.219 
Number of observations 3,602 711 
                    Source: Estimated according to data from Amadeus Bureau van Dijk (2012) and Worldscope (2012) 
In order to test our working hypothesis that exposure to fair value accounting is negatively related to 
aggregate earnings quality for companies and banks in Eastern European countries, we run several regression 
models. However, more detailed analysis of relations between each earnings attribute and the extent of 
exposure to fair value accounting will be conducted in doctoral research. These relations will be modeled by 
employing panel data analysis techniques that allow for individual company heterogeneity as well as for time 
effect. In Table 4 we regress mean relative importance of OCI for every company on company-level aggregate 
earnings quality. Three control proxies are applied: mean company size, mean accounting leverage and industry 
(e.g. Goncharov and Hodgson, 2008; Gaio, 2010; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). Higher values of aggregate 
earnings quality measure (AEQ) imply lower earnings quality. Therefore, in accordance with stated hypothesis 
we expect to find positive relation between AEQ and mean relative importance of OCI (mabsrelOCI).  
Estimated model is overall statistically significant with R-square of 30.85 percent. The coefficient on 
mapsrelOCIi is positive and statistically significant (coefficient =164.60, p-value=0.002) as predicted. This 
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suggests that companies in Eastern Europe with more fair value-oriented comprehensive income have lower 
level of aggregate earnings quality. 
Table 4: Impact of FV gains and losses through OCI on company’s aggregate earnings quality 
AEQi = ȕ0 + ȕ1*mabsrelOCIi + ȕ2*mLEVi + ȕ3*mSIZEi + ȕ4*INDi + İi 
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-stat P-value 
Constant ? 463.04*** 6.99 0.000 
mapsrelOCIi (ȕ1) + 164.60*** 3.30 0.002 
mLEVi (ȕ2) ? -126.89** -2.61 0.011 
mSIZEi (ȕ3) ? -10.38*** -2.65 0.010 
INDi (ȕ4) ? -1.03*** -2.91 0.005 
Number of obs. 75    
R2 30.85%    
F(4,70) 7.81***    
Source: Estimated according to data from Amadeus Bureau van Dijk (2012) and Worldscope (2012) 
Notes: *statistically significant at the 0.1 level; ** at 0.05 level; ***at 0.01 level respectively. 
P-values are two-tailed. 
The definitions of variables are as follows: AEQ is aggregate earnings quality ranking calculated as the average rank across the six 
individual measures; mabsrelOCI is mean abs(OCI)/(abs(OCI)+abs(NI)) for every company, mLEV is mean accounting leverage 
(total liabilities/total assets) for every company, mSIZE is mean natural logarithm of total assets for every company, IND is industry 
dummy variable. 
Similar results can be seen in Table 5 for the sample of listed banks from Eastern European countries. 
Estimated coefficient mapsrelOCIi is also positive and statistically significant (coefficient = 203.39, p-value = 
0.003) indicating that banks with larger mean proportion of fair value-oriented OCI have lower level of 
aggregate earnings quality measure. 
Table5: Impact of FV gains and losses through OCI on bank’s aggregate earnings quality 
AEQi = ȕ0 + ȕ1*mabsrelOCIi + ȕ2*mLEVi + ȕ3*mSIZEi + İi 
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-stat P-value 
Constant ? 344.54*** 4.32 0.000 
mapsrelOCIi (ȕ1) + 203.39*** 3.16 0.003 
mLEVi (ȕ2) ? -289.69*** -2.90 0.006 
mSIZEi (ȕ3) ? 0.337 0.10 0.919 
Number of obs. 40    
R2 31.75%    
F(3,36) 5.58***    
Source: Estimated according to data from Amadeus Bureau van Dijk (2012) and Worldscope (2012) 
Notes: *statistically significant at the 0.1 level; ** at 0.05 level; ***at 0.01 level respectively. 
P-values are two-tailed. 
The definitions of variables are as follows: AEQ is aggregate earnings quality ranking calculated as the average rank across the five 
individual measures; mabsrelOCI is mean abs(OCI)/(abs(OCI)+abs(NI)) for every bank, mLEV is mean accounting leverage (total 
liabilities/total assets) for every bank, mSIZE is mean natural logarithm of total assets for every bank. 
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4.2. Impact of fair value gains (losses) through net income on earnings quality 
Second part of empirical research is focused on relation between fair value gains (losses) reported through 
net income and banks’ earnings quality measures. This analysis is conducted on the subsample of listed banks 
from Eastern Europe only. Namely, we assume that companies in comparison to banks have financial assets 
and liabilities measured at FV thought net income to a lesser extent. Also, the data regarding fair value gains 
(losses) through net income for companies is not available for the sample researched. Table 6 presents 
descriptive statistics for pooled sample of banks. As it can be seen from the table below, mean relative 
proportion of fair value gains (losses) in net income is 17.8 percent which is similar to the proportion of banks’ 
OCI in comprehensive income (12.4 percent) from Table 3. However, median value is significantly lower (7.6 
percent) indicating that majority of banks have small proportion of fair value gains (losses) reported in net 
income. 
Table 6: Relative importance of fair value gains and losses through net income (FVI) 
Relative importance of FVI (absrel FVI)  
Mean 0.178 
Median 0.076 
Standard deviation 0.222 
Number of observations 189 
Source: Estimated according to data from Amadeus Bureau van Dijk (2012) and Worldscope (2012) 
Ordinary least square regression model is used to test the association between mean FV gains (losses) 
reported through net income on aggregate earnings quality measure. Tested model is overall statistically 
significant with R-square 18.37 percent. However, level of R-square is much lower than for the relation 
between FV gains (losses) reported through OCI and aggregate earnings quality (Table 5). Furthermore, 
coefficient mapsrelFVIi is only statistically significant on 10 percent level. 
Table 7: Impact of FV gains and losses through net income on bank’s aggregate earnings quality 
AEQi = ȕ0 + ȕ1*mabsrelFVIi + ȕ2*mLEVi  + İi 
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-stat P-value 
Constant ? 321.70*** 5.32 0.000 
mapsrelFVIi (ȕ1) + 89.40* 1.75 0.089 
mLEVi (ȕ2) ? -161.27** -2.29 0.028 
Number of obs. 38    
R2 18.37%    
F(3,36) 3.94**    
Source: Estimated according to data from Amadeus Bureau van Dijk (2012) and Worldscope (2012) 
Notes: *statistically significant at the 0.1 level; ** at 0.05 level; ***at 0.01 level respectively. 
P-values are two-tailed. 
The definitions of variables are as follows: AEQ is aggregate earnings quality ranking calculated as the average rank across the five 
individual measures; mabsrelFVI is mean abs(FVI)/(abs(FVI)+abs(HI)) for every bank, mLEV is mean accounting leverage (total 
liabilities/total assets) for every bank.  
Overall, the preliminary results in this section suggest that earnings with greater exposure to fair value 
accounting have lower level of aggregate earnings quality measure. 
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Although this research should have several contributions to existing literature, it is important to point out the 
possible limitations and concerns. Majority of our concerns is related to company-level earnings quality 
metrics. First, capital markets in emerging economies of Eastern Europe are less liquid, so in formativeness of 
stock prices and returns are questionable. Also, since company-level (bank-level) time series span only 10 
years and there are many missing data, the resulting regression have only few degrees of freedom. Therefore, 
our earnings conservatism ((ȕ2 + ȕ3)/ ȕ2) measure may have ill-designed for ȕ2 close to and below zero (Gassen 
et al., 2006). Second, the 2008 global financial crisis has had a great impact on Eastern European capital 
markets as well as on fundamental earning process of companies and banks. Third, not all authors agree that 
earnings smoothness is desirable attribute of earnings. Contrary, earnings smoothness is also used as a measure 
of earnings management (Leuz et al., 2003). Fourth, we measure the extent of fair value gains (losses) through 
the other comprehensive income by the amount of whole other comprehensive income and approximate it by 
“as if” estimates which can differ from “as-reported” measures of other comprehensive income. 
5. Conclusion 
Based on a review of previous literature it can be concluded that there has been a lack of research regarding 
the application of fair value accounting in transitional countries of Eastern Europe. Furthermore, most previous 
research examines the impact of fair value accounting on a single earnings attribute and derives mixed and 
inconsistent evidence. We assume that use of fair value concept may have significantly different effect on the 
earnings quality for Eastern European countries because of less liquid or inactive markets. In this institutional 
setting, fair values will more probably be estimated by the use of valuation techniques which enables earnings 
management and could lead to lower quality of reported earnings. Main empirical findings from preliminary 
research generally support our predictions. Results show that earnings under more fair value-based reporting 
system have lower aggregate quality rankings for companies and banks in Eastern European countries. Namely, 
we find preliminary evidence that the extent of more fair-value-based other comprehensive income is 
negatively related to aggregate earnings quality for both companies and banks. However, reported net gains 
(losses) on assets at fair value through banks’ income statement are less significant in explaining variation of 
earnings quality measures. Finally, more detailed analysis of relations between each earnings attribute and the 
extent of exposure to fair value accounting is left to be done in doctoral research. 
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